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Traditionally, there are two main approaches to enrichment by transfer, the 
common law ‘unjust factors’ approach and the civilian ‘absence of basis’ 
approach. In the aftermath of the so-called ‘swaps cases’, Peter Birks 
proclaimed the dethronement of the unjust factors in the English system, said 
that English law has embraced a German-style absence of basis approach, 
and proposed a new system of unjust enrichment. This article proceeds in two 
steps.  Firstly, it asks whether one of the two systems is superior to the other. 
Concluding that the ‘absence of basis’ approach may be conceptually clearer, 
it then argues that the English system should nonetheless be careful to adopt 
this approach for two reasons.  First, this new approach may not be suited to 
neighbouring fields of law (especially contract), and secondly, unjust 
enrichment does not occupy the same place in the legal landscape in Germany 
and England, it is of a different normative quality. 
 
Keywords:  
Comparative law, Unjust enrichment, Enrichment by transfer, Legal 
transplants, Harmonisation. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 120 
II. THE TWO SYSTEMS ................................................................................... 122 
 Unjust Factors .................................................................................... 122 1.
 Absence of Basis ................................................................................ 124 2.
III. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................. 126 
 The ‘swaps cases’ ............................................................................... 126 1.
2. Mistake of Law ................................................................................... 127 
IV. AN ENGLISH SYSTEM OF ABSENCE OF BASIS? ............................................ 131 
 Transplanting a Legal Concept ......................................................... 131 1.
                                                            
* Doctoral Candidate in Private Law and Teaching and Research Assistant at the 
Department of Roman Law and Antique Legal History at the University of Vienna, 
Austria. Mag. iur. (University of Vienna, 2010), LL.M. (Comparative and European 
Private Law, University of Edinburgh, 2013), e-mail: nathalie.neumayer@gmail.com. 
I would like to thank Dan Carr (University of Edinburgh), Shane McNamee 
(University of Bayreuth) and the anonymous reviewers of the EJLS for their 
comments on an earlier draft. 
2014] ‘Unjust Factors’ in Unjust Enrichment               120 
 Transplanting the ‘Absence of Basis’ Approach? .............................. 133 2.
 Unjust Enrichment in the Legal Landscape .................................... 136 3.




Since different routes may lead to the same result1 and surely all roads 
lead to Rome, I shall begin by quoting a Roman: 'Iure naturae aequum 
est neminem com alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri locupletiorem’ (It is fair 
according to the law of nature that no one should be enriched by loss 
and injustice to another).2 This seems to be stating the obvious. All too 
often, however, the picture gets blurrier the more one zooms in. How 
is ‘injustice’ to be understood? What determines the ‘just’ in unjust 
enrichment?  
 
The field of unjust enrichment is a vast one, so the present article is 
focusing on the scenario where the claimant transfers value to the 
defendant which was not due, what Birks calls the ‘core case’. There 
are two main approaches to this problem, one of which we shall call 
the common law and the other the civil law approach.  
 
Traditionally, the common law has dealt with this scenario in terms of 
so-called unjust factors, even though it has been pointed out that ‘no 
common lawyer had heard of unjust factors before Birks introduced 
them in 1985’, meaning that before Birks, the law of unjust enrichment 
was far less organised.3 Civil law countries, on the other hand, favour 
an approach that focuses on the absence of a legal basis. As examples 
for a common law and a civil law system, the English and the German 
systems of unjust enrichment are the most prominent representatives 
of each legal family. These two systems are, on the one hand, deeply 
rooted in the system of unjust factors (England) and, on the other hand, 
                                                            
1 The reader may forgive the pun. The ‘different routes’ are the different legal 
systems, and the ‘result’ is the answer to the question when restitution is due. For 
enrichment by transfer, which is the focus of this paper, it will be shown below that 
the results, that is whether there has to be restitution or not, are similar in both 
systems. Given the same facts of a case, restitution may have to be made due to 
mistake in the context of English law, or due to an absence of legal basis in the 
context of German law.  
2 Pomponius, De Regulis Iuris, D50, 17, 206; translation taken from Peter Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 268, (n 4). 
3 Steve Hedley, ‘The Empire Strikes Back? A Restatement of the Law of Unjust 
Enrichment’ (2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 759, 766.  
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possibly the most highly developed system of unjust enrichment in 
civilian countries. For reasons of simplicity and clarity, I will briefly 
outline both approaches by reference to the English and German 
systems of unjust enrichment by transfer.  
 
In the course of a general tendency towards unification or convergence 
of the legal systems within the European Union, the system of unjust 
factors has had to face some criticism. Most notably, Sonja Meier's 
article ‘Unjust factors and Legal Grounds’4 has, if not kicked off, then 
at least intensified the academic discussion on whether a system based 
on the German model is superior to an unjust factors-based system. In 
fact, her arguments have managed to convince one of the champions of 
the unjust factors approach, Peter Birks, who in his last book famously 
proclaimed that ‘[a]lmost everything of mine now needs calling back 
for burning’.5 Birks claimed that an English absence of basis approach 
was not a product of his academic creativity, but had already seeped 
into English case law via the so-called ‘swaps cases’,6 which will be 
sketched out in due course. Although the proclamation of having to 
burn everything previously written might have been a little premature, 
it can be observed that, without doubt, Birks’s book has fuelled 
academic discussion.  
 
This essay will deal with two main questions. The first one is, whether 
it can be said that one of the two systems of unjust enrichment is 
superior to the other. Is one of the systems simply better suited to the 
type of cases that come before the courts? Can it be said that one 
system excels in terms of conceptual clarity? The second question is, 
with reference to Birks's arguments, whether English law should adopt 
the German approach. 
 
For the second question, I will briefly outline the new model of unjust 
enrichment based on absence of basis as suggested by Peter Birks in 
his last book7 and argue that the approach as presented might need 
more thought. As it is, it might not be suited to the English system of 
private law generally and the English system of unjust enrichment 
                                                            
4 Sonja Meier, 'Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds' in David Johnston and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds),Unjustified Enrichment. Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (CUP 
2002). 
5 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 2), xii. 
6 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 2), 99. 
7 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 2). 
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specifically. Changing the legal construction behind unjust enrichment 
does not only affect this field of law, but also interacts with other fields 
of law, most importantly contract law.   
 
II. THE TWO SYSTEMS  
 
 Unjust Factors 1.
 
The law of unjust enrichment is a rather young area of law in 
England.8 In Moses v MacFerlan, Lord Mansfield described various 
circumstances in which a transfer of value needs to be reversed,9 but 
those instances were understood to be specific remedies and not a 
closed area of law. In 1966, the first textbook on restitution was 
published,10 but even 12 years later, in 1978, the judiciary had not been 
convinced of the existence of unjust enrichment as an independent 
field of law.11 It was not until 1991 that unjust enrichment was finally 
accepted by the courts in Lipkin Gorman v Karpmale Ltd. 12  
 
The English law of unjust enrichment (by transfer) builds upon four 
requirements, which have been expressed for example in Banque 
Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd. The defendant (i) must be 
enriched (ii) at the claimant's expense. This enrichment has to be (iii) 
unjust and (iv) the defendant must not have a valid defence against the 
claim.13 It is the third requirement that is of interest in this context. 
                                                            
8 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung (3rd edn, 
Mohr Siebeck 1996), 553.  
9 (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.). 
10 Lord Goff of Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution (Sweet & Maxwell 
1966).  
11 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95 (HL) 104 (Lord Diplock): ‘[T]here is 
no general doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in English law. What it does is 
to provide specific remedies in particular cases of what might be classified as unjust 
enrichment in a legal system that is based on the civil law.’ 
12 Christiane Wendehorst, ‘Die Leistungskondiktionen und ihre Binnenstruktur’ in 
Reinhard Zimmermann (ed), Grundstrukturen eines Europäischen Bereicherungsrechts 
(Mohr Siebeck 2005) 47, 55; Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, 578 (Lord 
Goff of Chieveley): ‘The recovery of money in restitution is not, as a general rule, a 
matter of discretion for the court. A claim to recover money at common law is made 
as a matter of right; and even though the underlying principle of recovery is the 
principle of unjust enrichment, nevertheless, where recovery is denied, it is denied 
on the basis of legal principle.’  
13 Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1998] 2 WLR 475, 479. 
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How does the injustice of a transfer manifest itself? The common law 
asks the claimant to show that the transfer was unjust. This idea has 
existed in the common law for centuries, even though it has not been 
referred to as ‘unjust factors approach’.14 More modern textbooks have 
included positive lists of unjust factors. 
 
However, the concrete list differs from textbook to textbook. Andrew 
Burrows, for example, includes mistake, duress, ignorance, undue 
influence, exploitation, legal compulsion, necessity, failure of 
consideration, incapacity, illegality, ultra vires demand of public 
authorities, etc. 15  In his influential categorisation of unjust factors, 
Peter Birks distinguishes between non-voluntary and policy-motivated 
unjust factors. Non-voluntary factors concern the nature of the 
claimant's (non-)consent. Birks further subdivides these possible 
vitiations of consent into 'impaired consent' (mistake, duress, undue 
influence, exploitation of weakness, human incapacity, 'qualified 
consent' (failure of consideration) and 'no consent'.16 As those factors 
do not cover all cases in which restitution should be granted, Birks also 
includes a supplementary category of so-called policy-motivated factors. 
Within this category, a claimant will be successful if he can show that, 
regardless of his intention, there is a specific reason for restitution, for 
example in order to ‘reinforce governmental respect for the rule of law 
or to encourage withdrawal from illegal actions’.17 An example for a 
policy-motivated factor, the ‘Woolwich’ factor, will be briefly discussed 
below.  
 
However, it needs to be pointed out that if there is a legal obligation, 
the mere existence of an unjust factor will normally not justify the 
retention of the money conferred.18  
 
As can be easily seen, the unjust factors approach revolves largely 
around the transferor's intent (with policy reasons acting as a 
corrective measure). If his or her decision to transfer a benefit has not 
                                                            
14 Mitchell McInnes, ‘The Reason to Reverse: Unjust Factors and Juristic Reason’ 
(2012) Boston University Law Review 1049, 1052; Hedley, ‘The Empire Strikes Back?’ 
(n 3), 766. 
15 Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution  (3rd edn, OUP 2011). 
16 Peter Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution (OUP 1985). 
17 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 2), 106; Andrew Burrows and others, A Restatement of 
the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2012) 5 [s 3(2)(b)].  
18 Burrows and others, Restatement (n 17), 6 [s 3(6)].    
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been made freely and without vitiating factors, the benefit is to be 
returned. The intention to transfer cannot be said to have an equal all-
importance in the so-called ‘no basis’ approach. 
 
 Absence of Basis 2.
The German system of unjustified enrichment (rather than unjust 
enrichment) follows a very different model. If we can define the 
English approach to unjust enrichment as ‘the transfer of benefit is 
only unjust if your will has been vitiated in a legally relevant way’, the 
German model takes a different path. 
 
§ 812 (1) BGB states that ‘[a] person who obtains something as a result 
of the performance of another person or otherwise at his expense 
without legal grounds for doing so is under a duty to make restitution 
to him. This duty also exists if the legal grounds later lapse or if the 
result intended to be achieved by those efforts in accordance with the 
contents of the legal transaction does not occur.’19 
 
This is to say that a transfer of benefit must be justified by a legal 
ground. Should this legal ground turn out to have been void from the 
beginning or if it is avoided ex tunc, no legally relevant justification will 
remain. From this it follows that if there is no basis for the transaction, 
it ought to be reversed. But what counts, under German law, as a valid 
legal ground? 
 
As a general rule, it can be said that contracts are the most common 
legal grounds. Contracts of sale, lease, etc. all provide the enriched 
with a reason to keep the benefit transferred to him or her. Unlike 
English law, German law includes gifts, gratuitous use and gratuitous 
services in its definition of contract.20 In addition, in some special cases 
even non-contracts can act as a sufficient legal basis. There are three 
different kinds of 'just factors' (as Thomas Krebs calls them in a semi-
                                                            
19  Translation via http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p3396; ‘Wer durch die Leistung eines 
anderen oder in sonstiger Weise auf dessen Kosten etwas ohne rechtlichen Grund 
erlangt, ist ihm zur Herausgabe verpflichtet. Diese Verpflichtung besteht auch dann, 
wenn der rechtliche Grund später wegfällt oder der mit einer Leistung nach dem 
Inhalt des Rechtsgeschäfts bezweckte Erfolg nicht eintritt.’ 
20 Gerhard Dannemann, 'Unjust Enrichment as Absence of Basis: Can English Law 
Cope' in Andrew Burrows and Alan Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law. Essays in 
Memory of Peter Birks (OUP 2006), pp 364-369. 
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serious way).21 Firstly, a valid legal basis can still be established where a 
contract is unenforceable solely due to shortcomings of a formal nature. 
By way of example, § 518 contains a requirement for gifts to be 
acknowledged by a notary in order to be binding. If, however, a gift is 
executed without having complied with this rule, it can nevertheless 
not be claimed back. Secondly, restitution will not be granted in cases 
of so-called 'natural obligations'. Natural obligations are claims that are 
not completely void, but merely unenforceable. Still, money that has 
been paid on the basis of a natural obligation may be retained by the 
defendant. The most important applications of this exception are 
gambling contracts. Although gambling contracts cannot be validly 
concluded, a 'debtor's' performance will not be recoverable.22 Thirdly, 
obligations that are unenforceable because they have become time-
barred continue to be a sufficient justification for retention.23 
 
Restitution will not only follow where there has not been a legally 
enforceable obligation in the first place. Transactions may be avoided, 
that is rescinded with retroactive effect. In this case, the rules of 
unjustified enrichment will be applied.24 
 
Illegality of transactions is a special case in German unjustified 
enrichment law. The mere illegality of a transaction does not 
automatically trigger § 812 et seq. BGB even though it may render a 
contract void. Once an illegal contract has been executed, it depends 
on the nature of the legal prohibition whether the transaction can be 
reversed.25 
 
It can, therefore, be said that unjust factors are reasons that justify 
restitution, while legal grounds act as a justification for the enriched to 
retain the gain. While a system based on unjust factors might be called 
subjective, as it focuses on the claimant's will, the sine causa model can 
be described as objective, since it builds on the factual lack of a legal 
justification for the transfer.26   
                                                            
21 Thomas Krebs, 'In Defence of Unjust Factors' in David Johnston and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds),  
Unjustified Enrichment. Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (CUP 2001), pp 88-90. 
22 § 762 (1) BGB. 
23 § 222 (2) BGB. 
24 § 142 (1) BGB. 
25 § 134 BGB. 
26 David Johnston and Reinhard Zimmermann, 'Unjustified Enrichment: Surveying 




Having now briefly introduced the two systems of unjust enrichment, 
we can turn to the first question of this essay. How well do both 
approaches perform in comparison to each other? Can it be said that 
one of them yields fairer results than the other one, that is, is one 
approach more prone to rendering solutions to cases that are in 
accordance with ideas of justice and fairness? 
 
Let us start with Birks’s core case, the direct payment of money by the 
claimant to the defendant. A pays B money under the mistaken 
assumption that he owes him money, when in reality this is not the 
case. The problem now arises when the claimant desires to have this 
money returned to him. According to German law, the starting point is 
that the enrichment that has taken place is initially unjustified, unless 
there is a legal basis to justify it. This legal basis, as we have seen, can 
be a contract or a natural obligation. In the present case, there is no 
such legal basis, therefore the claimant will be successful. 
 
An English claimant would have to deal with an inverse situation, 
namely that the enrichment would be thought of as just, unless he can 
show that there has been an ‘unjust factor’ at work that vitiated the 
transaction. If he can show that he was labouring under a mistake 
which caused the transaction, and the defendant does not have a valid 
defence which would entitle him to keep the money, he will be 
successful with his claim. As can be seen, the results in both systems 
are the same for this core case.  
 
 The ‘swaps cases’  1.
Now let us turn to a series of cases that proved to be very important to 
the discourse on unjust enrichment law, the so-called ‘swaps cases’. 
The cases shall be briefly sketched: an interest swap is, in essence, a 
mutual loan. While one party agrees to pay interest at a fixed rate, the 
other one pays a floating charge that varies over the course of the loan. 
In the early 1990s, a lot of local (UK) authorities were parties to such 
arrangements. When the House of Lords decided in 1992 that such 
contracts were void because they exceeded the authorities’ money 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the Landscape' in David  Johnston and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified 
Enrichment. Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (CUP 2005), 5. 
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management powers, the question as to restitution arose. Some 
contracts had already been fully performed, others had not. On which 
ground could restitution be granted? Following the German approach, 
the solution would simply be that the contract has been declared void 
and therefore, the transactions have to be reversed for want of legal 
ground.  
 
The situation presents itself as slightly more complicated if one were to 
adhere to the unjust factors approach. The parties had not been acting 
mistakenly, given that the contracts were not void at the time they were 
entered into. Restitution was finally granted on the basis of ‘absence of 
consideration’.27Additionally, in Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln CC, it was 
decided that restitution could also be granted because of mistake of 
law.28 Again, the destination of the restitutionary journey remains the 
same, it is only the routes that diverge.  
 
1. Mistake of Law  
This generous application of the unjust factor of mistake has led to 
some discussion. At common law, the same mistake can work on two 
levels. On a 'lower' contractual level it may be substantial enough to 
make the contract, which underlies a transfer, voidable. On a 'higher' 
level or in unjust enrichment, it may give rise to a claim for restitution. 
So, even if it is one mistake, it is taken into account in two different 
fields of law. 
 
Sonja Meier has looked into the relationship between the mistake that 
triggers unjust enrichment rules and the mistake that avoids the 
underlying contract. She contends that ‘it is not possible to 
differentiate mistakes in restitution without resorting to a legal-ground 
analysis’,29 pointing out that English law has given some relevance to a 
legal ground in denying recovery in the case of a mistaken payment of 
an existing obligation. 30 She has argued that in actuality what the 
common law rules on which mistakes lead to restitution really deal 
with is an analysis of the existence of a legal basis.31For this, she 
                                                            
27 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1994] 4 All ER 890; Kleinwort 
Benson Ltd v Sandwell BC [1994] 4 All ER 890; Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 2), 110; the 
implications of this decision will be discussed in the next part. 
28 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL). 
29 Meier, ‘Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds’ (n 4), 53. 
30 Steam Saw Mills v Bearing Brothers [1922] 1 Ch 244. 
31 Meier, ‘Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds’ (n 4), 56. 
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mentions two examples. 
 
Firstly, she discusses the rules on mistake of law. In English law, the 
mistake of law has a turbulent history. While mistake of fact had always 
been a reason for recovery of a payment, Bilbie v Lumley32 rendered a 
mere mistake of law legally irrelevant. However, following the swaps 
cases (which have been discussed above),33 mistake of law is – once 
again – recognised as a valid ground for recovery. 
 
The question whether recovery is possible based on a mistake of law is 
particularly relevant for natural obligations. Natural obligations are 
contracts which are not void, but merely unenforceable. In Moses v 
MacFerlan, a so-called negative list of unenforceable claims has been 
established by Lord Mansfield. A claim:  
 
‘does not lie for money paid by the plaintiff, which is claimed of him 
as payable in point of honour and honesty, although it could not have 
been recovered from him by any course of law; as in payment of a debt 
barred by the Statute of limitations, or contracted during his infancy, 
or to the extent of principal and legal interest upon an usurious 
contract, or, for money fairly lost at play: because in all these cases, 
the defendant may retain it with a safe conscience, though by positive 
law he was barred from recovering.’34  
 
This list has regained relevance because of the abolishment of the 
mistake of law rule. Does this mean that recovery is now possible for 
all payments made in discharge of a natural obligation? According to 
Meier, this inconsistency reveals the reasoning behind the special 
status of a mistake of law: ‘This (…) obscures the true reason why 
recovery is excluded: not because of the nature of the mistake, but 
because of the obligation on which the claimant paid: an obligation 
which provided the defendant with a justification to keep the benefit.’35 
 
3. Payment in Doubt  
 
The second example deals with the situation in which a claimant 
makes a payment in order to discharge an obligation which he or she is 
                                                            
32 (1802) 2 east 469.  
33 Notably Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1998] 3 WLR 1095. 
34 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005 (KB). 
35 Meier, ‘Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds’ (n 4), 56. 
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not sure exists. 
 
When the payer is unaware of the invalidity of the obligation, the 
situation presents itself as fairly straightforward. While German law 
focuses entirely on the circumstance that there is, in fact, no obligation 
(with the possible defence of knowledge in case the claimant knew of 
its non-existence), English law takes the other route and asks the 
claimant to show a mistake. As long as the claimant does not have any 
doubts about his liability, the outcomes in both systems are the same. 
The results only diverge if the payer is not sure whether or not he or 
she is bound to pay. 
 
The case of Woolwich v IRC36 can be taken as an example. The Inland 
Revenue demanded taxes from the Woolwich Building Society, which 
it was not allowed to levy, thus acting ultra vires. The Woolwich 
Building Society submitted to the claim, but expressed a reservation. 
After having challenged the tax and having it repaid, Inland Revenue 
refused to pay interest on the amount. In order to have a restitutionary 
claim on the interest, the Woolwich Building Society would have had 
to show that there had been an unjust factor. However, it had not been 
labouring under mistake (or any other unjust factor) because it knew 
that Inland Revenue was acting ultra vires. Eventually, the case was 
decided in favour of the Woolwich Building Society for reasons of 
policy. 
 
In German law, there is a policy to limit recovery for payments made in 
doubt. Following the good faith principle, the defendant should be 
able to rely on the conduct of the claimant. If there is a payment, there 
is an assumption of its intended finality. However, the claimant can 
make an express reservation. In doing so, he or she retains the option 
of recovery. 
 
In England, the payer in doubt has two options: he can either submit 
to the claim, pay, and thus exclude recovery (because doubt seems to 
exclude the possibility of labouring under a mistake of any kind), or he 
can refuse to pay and litigate. That means that nullity does not 
automatically trigger restitution in English law, although for the 
majority of cases there will be restitution on the basis of an unjust 
                                                            
36 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] AC 70, 161. 
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factor.37 
 
Meier criticised this approach as impractical. The question of liability 
is usually unclear to both parties and not solely to the claimant.38 To 
her, an approach that tries to reconcile the problem of submission with 
a system of unjust factors just misses the goal. Even if one were to 
introduce new unjust factors like 'transactional inequality',39 it would 
only distract from the actual reason for recovery, which is the absence 
of a legal basis. She advocates a submission principle that takes the 
form of a defence in case the defendant was ignorant of the claimant's 
doubt.40   
 
By way of summary, it can be noted that the unjust factor approach 
and the absence of basis approach both yield essentially identical 
results.41 That means that ‘English law certainly allows a plaintiff to sue 
in most of the situations where he would have a claim for enrichment 
on the Continent’.42 The difference, however, lies in the route that is 
taken to get there. Whereas English law assumes that an enrichment is 
‘just’ as long as there is no unjust factor vitiating the transfer, German 
law has a different starting point. According to German logic, the 
enrichment is initially unjust and must be justified by a legal ground. 
German law is therefore ‘looking for 'justification' rather than 
'injustice'’’. 43  For reasons of elegance and conceptual clarity, the 
absence of basis approach could seem preferable to some. However, it 
seems to be a matter of juridical taste whether elegance and conceptual 
clarity are categories that should be relevant in this context.  
 
Peter Birks seems to have been convinced. But should English law 
really jump the unjust factors ship and join the legal ground force? 
This shall be examined in the following paragraphs.  
                                                            
37 Krebs, ‘In Defence of Unjust Factors’ (n 21), 78. 
38 Meier, ‘Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds’ (n 4), 60. 
39  Peter Birks, 'No Consideration: Restitution After Void Contracts' (1993) 23 
University of Western Australia Law Review 233. 
40 Meier, ‘Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds’ (n 4), 61. 
41 Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Unjustified Enrichment: The Modern Civilian Approach’ 
(1995) 15/3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403, 414; cf. Hedley, ‘The Empire Strikes 
Back?’ (n 3) pp 766-769. 
42 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (trans by Tony 
Weir, 2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1992), 590. 
43 Hedley, ‘The Empire Strikes Back?’ (n 3), 766. 




IV. AN ENGLISH SYSTEM OF ABSENCE OF BASIS? 
 
This leads us to the next question that shall be dealt with. Accepting 
that the absence of basis approach displays some advantages to looking 
for unjust factors (conceptual clarity and elegance), would it be the 
next logical step for the English system to adopt this approach?  
 
 Transplanting a Legal Concept  1.
Before dealing with this question, it is useful to first very briefly 
outline the theoretical background in comparative law that such a 
potential transplantation assumes. The discussion about the 
‘transplantability’ of legal rules, institutions, etc. is an old one in 
comparative law. On one end of the transplantability spectrum, it is 
asserted that law as a system is closed in itself and functions 
autonomously, without the necessary influences of culture and society. 
Theorists on the other end of this spectrum believe that law is to a 
great extent a product of other, meta-legal factors, like culture, 
sociology, psychology, philosophy, etc. It is these two ends of the 
spectrum that I restrict the account of this debate to.  
 
The expression ‘legal transplants’ was coined by Professor Alan 
Watson in his 1974 book ‘Legal Transplants. An Approach to 
Comparative Law’. In this book, he examines the history of legal 
developments and comes to the conclusion that the main motor of 
legal progress has always been a vivid practice of borrowing (one could 
almost say stealing) legal rules and institutions from other systems.44 He 
comes up with numerous historic examples, e.g. the adoption of 
Roman systematics in Scottish law.45 In demonstrating the possibility 
and indeed practice of implanting foreign legal building blocks into 
another system, Watson opposes what William Ewald calls the ‘mirror 
theories’ of law.46 Mirror theories are theories that assume, ‘sometimes 
explicitly, more often tacitly, that the law changes in response to forces 
external to law - that law reflects the power relations of society, or the 
                                                            
44 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants. An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, The 
University of Georgia Press 1993) 95.  
45 Watson, Legal Transplants (n 44), 36 ff.  
46 William Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ 
(1995) 43/4 American Journal of Comparative Law 489, 492; for examples of such 
theories see Watson, Legal Transplants (n 44) 21ff and Lawrence Friedman, A History 
of American Law (1st edn, Simon & Schuster 1973), 595.  
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workings of the market, or the ideology of possessive individualism, or 
the promptings of the judicial sub-conscious, or the cunning of the 
Weltgeist, or the self-interest of the dominant class, or the political 
ideology of the age; that, because law does not possess an autonomous 
existence, legal scholars should steep themselves in other disciplines, 
such as sociology, or anthropology, or philosophy, or economics, or 
literary criticism, or critical theory.’47 
 
One of the most vocal proponents of this view, i.e. the view that the 
law is an expression of ‘something else’, of values that underlie a 
particular society, is Pierre Legrand. He emphasises the importance of 
legal culture to the meaning of rules, therefore closely tying together 
sociological, philosophical and legal aspects. Others have identified 
factors that might play into the understanding of law within a 
particular culture – in addition to ‘black letter law’, the social 
acceptance thereof, the role of courts, judges and the legal profession, 
the notion of what law is in a particular society in general, legal 
reasoning and methodology, etc. may all play into the particular 
appearance of law in a given culture.48 Therefore, to Legrand, rules are 
inseparably intertwined with cultural aspects. 49  This is why legal 
transplants (of rules) are impossible to Legrand and others at this end 
of the spectrum. -‘Anyone who takes the view that ‘the law’ or ‘the 
rules of the law’ travel across jurisdictions must have in mind that law 
is a somewhat autonomous entity unencumbered by historical, 
epistemological, or cultural baggage.’50  
 
The problem with Legrand is, however, not least a political one. If we 
believe that legal cultures or systems or however one wishes to group 
them, are so insurmountably different, the underlying assumption 
must be that, for example, a German citizen per se is essentially 
different from a French citizen per se or an English citizen per se. This 
would open the gates to all kinds of generalisations and prejudices. Of 
                                                            
47 Ewald, ‘The Logic of Legal Transplants’ (n 46), 490. 
48 David Nelken, ‘Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation’ in David Nelken and 
Johannes Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing 2007), 7, pp 24-6.  
49 Anthony Forsyth, ‘The ‘Transplantability’ Debate in Comparative Law and in 
Comparative Labour Law: Implications for Australian Borrowing from European 
Labour Law’ (2006) University of Melbourne Working Paper Series, Working Paper 
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Journal of European and Comparative Law 111, 114. 
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course, it would be a futile exercise to deny the obvious differences in 
the legal systems, but conversely it would be inappropriately fatalist to 
assert their ‘unchangeability’, or indeed to understand culture as a 
homogeneous unit. As Watson says himself, ‘[m]uch about Legrand’s 
approach and our disagreement is revealed by his statement (…) that 
the word Brot in German means something different from the French 
word pain. (…) Pain in French and in France is not the same as pain in 
French and in France. For a poor village housewife ‘bread’ has not the 
same meaning as for the wealthy Parisian businessman. (…) It is banal 
to notice that the same legal rule operates differently in two countries: 
it operates to different effect even within one.’51  
 
The influence of such cultural differences (national or regional) should 
not be overemphasised. History has shown that legal borrowing has 
been going on for centuries, or indeed millennia, and in many 
instances successfully (e.g. the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, which united 
the previously fragmented laws in what is Germany today, or the 
acceptance of the Uniform Commercial Code by all states of the 
USA).52 So on a practical level, the possibility of transplanting legal 
rules or institutions is a historical fact.  
 
 Transplanting the ‘Absence of Basis’ Approach?  2.
After this brief theoretical excursion, let us return to the question that 
has been posed earlier, which is whether English law should adopt the 
‘absence of basis’ approach. In this context, the ‘swaps cases’, which 
have been discussed above, are of particular interest. They constituted 
an important landmark in the academic discourse on the law of unjust 
enrichment in England. Not only did they reintroduce ‘mistake of law’ 
as a ground for recovery, 53  but also they caused Peter Birks to 
overthrow his previous model of unjust enrichment. Birks understood 
the granting of restitution based on failure of consideration as a 
dethronement of the system of unjust factors – what ‘failure of 
consideration’ really meant is that there was no contract. Birks could 
come to this conclusion only by re-examining the concept of 
‘consideration’. He asserted that the consideration that fails in an 
                                                            
51 Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law‘ (2000) 4/4 Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law via http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html.   
52 Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law‘ (n 51).   
53 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL); Zimmermann, ‘Unjustified 
Enrichment: The Modern Civilian Approach’ (n 41), 414. 
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unjust enrichment context is the same that would conclude a contract, 
and does not merely concern counter-performance.54 The court had 
therefore engaged in a legal ground analysis.55   
 
In the aftermath of these cases, Peter Birks therefore attempted to 
combine the common law and the civil law approaches and suggested a 
new system of unjust enrichment for English law. His most radical 
change is that he replaced the positive requirement of an unjust factor 
with the negative requirement of an absence of basis. In order not to 
completely give up on the traditional system, unjust factors feed into 
the 'super category' of no basis. Whether there is a basis or not 
depends on the nature of the enrichment. Birks distinguishes between 
participatory and non-participatory enrichments, further subdividing 
the first category in obligatory and voluntary enrichments. In non-
participatory enrichments, on the other hand, the benefit may be 
claimed because the claimant did not participate in the acquisition of 
the gain. In obligatory enrichments, the benefit was transferred 
without an obligation, while in voluntary enrichments the benefit has 
been transferred in expectation of a purpose to come about which 
subsequently fails. 
 
This Birksian model faced a lot of criticism. Andrew Burrows has 
pointed out that the results are mainly the same, regardless of which 
approach is applied to cases, which also has been shown here 
previously.56 Concerning the elegance and ease of application of both 
systems, Burrows holds that they are superficial.57 He gives two main 
reasons for this conclusion.58 
 
Firstly, Birks's wide notion of gift is problematic. In his concept of by-
                                                            
54 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 2), 118; for the different meanings of ‘consideration’ see 
also Graham Virgo, ‘Failure of consideration: myth and meaning in the English law 
of restitution’ in David Johnston and Reinhard Zimmermann, Unjustified Enrichment: 
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55 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 2), pp 117-118; critically: Hedley, ‘The Empire Strikes 
Back?’ (n 3), pp 771-772.  
56  Andrew Burrows, ‘Absence of Basis: The New Birksian Scheme’ in Andrew 
Burrows and Alan Rodger, Mapping the Law. Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (OUP 
2006) 33, 44. 
57  Also Chris L Hunt, 'Unjust Enrichment Understood as Absence of Basis: a 
Critical Evaluation with Lessons from Canada' (2009) Oxford U Comparative L 
Forum 6 at ouclf.iuscomp.org.  
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benefits, Birks understands as gift benefits transferred upon the 
defendant, but which are not unjust enrichment.59 This is the case if, 
for example, the defendant, who lives in the flat above the claimant, 
profits from the claimant's heating. To understand this as a gift indeed 
seems a bit far-fetched. It could probably just as well be assumed that 
the claimant would prefer to keep all of the heating energy to him- or 
herself, were this technically feasible. To see donative intent in an act 
that is a result of lack of alternatives is pushing the notion of a gift a 
little too far. The claimant’s intent cannot be simply assumed.60     
 
The second point corresponds to a point that has been made by Sonja 
Meier (see above). However, while for her it is problematic that an 
unjust factors approach treats the same factual mistake on two 
different levels (contract and unjust enrichment), Burrows criticises 
Birks's model  for it '‘pushes out of sight many of the difficult 
questions of law that are dealt with ‘up front’ under the common law 
approach’.61 From a conceptual perspective, it is hard to understand 
why this should be detrimental to the elegance of a system. Separating 
the question of whether there is a basis or not from the rules on unjust 
enrichment can only contribute to an enhanced clarity of the 
subject.Ultimately, he does not altogether dismiss Birks's model, but 
suggests its use as a point of reference for a 'cross-check' in difficult 
cases.62  
 
On the more favourable side of reception, it has been said that a shift 
to the absence of basis approach is feasible in English law and has its 
advantages, like speeding up the process of legal development. 63 
However, in order for a no basis approach to dovetail with the general 
English law, a few adaptations would have to be made, as Dannemann 
points out. First and foremost, English law would have to recognise 
certain agreements outside of contract law as valid legal bases, such as 
gratuitous services, gratuitous use, gifts and trusts. As it stands at the 
moment, the law on what qualifies as a legally binding contract under 
English law is very restrictive. German law recognises a greater range 
of agreements as contracts. Secondly, more attention would have to be 
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given to the distinction between merely unenforceable and void 
contracts, considering the latter are altogether unfit to provide a 
justification for retention.64 Finally, English law would have to find 
new solutions to cases like Woolwich v IRC, where the claimant 
performs under protest (see above).65 
 
 Unjust Enrichment in the Legal Landscape  3.
In this last section, the place of unjust enrichment law in the whole of 
private law shall briefly be examined. Why is that important? It is a 
question of whether one can compare the functions that unjust 
enrichment law has in the German system to that in the English system. 
It is vital to the question of whether the English system should adopt 
the continental approach to examine whether the law of unjust 
enrichment has the same function and place within the whole of the 
law. If that is not the case, one would be comparing apples with pears.  
 
Can unjust enrichment law be perceived as a uniform or unified 
system of law in its own right or is its role rather that of a gap-filler 
which is applied to the ‘leftovers’ of contract and tort law? Stephen 
Smith and Peter Jaffey have made two distinctions that can be used for 
the purpose of locating unjust enrichment. 
 
What is the law of unjust enrichment? Having started out as a part of 
the catch-all category of quasi contracts in Roman law, it has without 
doubt gained in substance over the last centuries. But where can we 
locate it now in the interplay of the different legal areas? 
 
Stephen Smith has divided the different approaches to the law of 
unjust enrichment in what he calls the unitary and the pluralist 
approach. 66  While the unitary approach is, in short, the civilian 
approach which has a single overarching principle, the pluralist 
approach corresponds to the system of unjust factors. Smith bases this 
distinction on an analogy with tort law. Here, similarly, the fault lines 
between the civilian and the common law can be traced along either 
the plurality of torts or the one principle of tort law (Schadenersatz).   
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In contrast, Peter Jaffey has looked into what he calls the strong theory 
and the weak theory of unjust enrichment.67 Both theories deal with 
the nature of the defendant's duty to give back the benefit obtained. 
On the one hand, the weak theory of unjust enrichment merely says 
that ‘there are claims that arise from the receipt of a benefit by the 
defendant and that serve to transfer the benefit from the defendant to 
the claimant.’68 This does not tell us anything about where the claims 
come from or why they should be given back. ‘To state that something 
amounts to unjustified enrichment is merely a conclusion, that because 
the enrichment is unjustified it should be returned, restored or made 
over to the person properly entitled to it. That conclusion is in need of 
supporting normative argument. But what sort of argument?’69 A weak 
theory of unjust enrichment points toward a field of law different from 
unjust enrichment to make clear which types of enrichment are just or 
unjust.  
 
On the other hand, the strong theory recognises unjust enrichment as 
a field of law which is equivalent to either contract or tort. All claims 
arising having received a benefit can be based on one principle, which 
unites the whole of the law of unjust enrichment. The strong theory of 
unjust enrichment implies that the duty to restore finds its reason in 
the legal realm of unjust enrichment rules. Therefore, the strong 
theory is a normative theory.   
 
According to Jaffey, many common law writers accept the ‘strong 
theory’ as a given and unjust enrichment as a ‘tertium quid’, a separate 
domain of private law.70Indeed, it appears that the civilian approach 
would adhere to Jaffey’s ‘weak theory’ and Smith’s unitary approach. 
In the words of Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘[i]t is difficult to see why the 
law of unjustified enrichment should be saddled with the task of 
sorting out the fate of the contractual relationship between recipient 
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and transferor.’ 71  Similarly, Gerhard Dannemann describes the 
German law of unjust enrichment as dovetailing with the law of 
contract in the BGB.72 Jan Smits talks of the ‘residual character of 
restitution law’.73 Although a member of the common law academia, 
James Gordley argues in a similar vein. The law of unjust enrichment 
is not a complete field of law in its own right, but rather a means to 
cater to ‘the need in disparate cases to fill gaps left by other branches 
of the law’.74 Despite the seemingly denser, more unified structure of 
unjust enrichment law in Germany, the law of unjust enrichment by 
transfer acts more like an automaton following one overarching 
principle, the reversal of enrichments (whose unjustness needs to be 
determined by a legal norm that lies outside of the law of unjust 
enrichment itself). It takes effect once an unjust enrichment has been 
detected (due to the lack of legal ground). Almost parasitic in its 
essence, it does not aim to establish rules on when an instance of 
enrichment is unjust.  
 
But what does this mean for our present enquiry? The answer is two 
things. First, it shows that the place and function of unjust enrichment 
are substantially different in Germany and England. While in Germany 
it has a distinctly residual character depending strongly on legal norms 
outside of unjust enrichment, England’s unjust factors are structurally 
parallel to tort law, which means English unjust enrichment is more 
independent from other fields of law. Secondly and as a consequence, 
one should be careful to implant a foreign concept to another legal 
system. In order for England to embrace an absence of basis approach, 
many adaptations would have to be made, specifically to the law of 




Whether unjust factors or absence of basis, the different approaches of 
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common law and civil law systems seem deeply engrained in the 
scholars' minds. In this essay, both systems have been sketched in 
broad strokes, and then analysed and compared. By way of conclusion, 
it can be said that even though the results may be the same or at least 
very similar, the absence of basis approach has a slight advantage over 
the unjust factors approach in that it is conceptually clearer and seems 
more straightforward in its application. 
  
Even if the elegance has been called 'superficial' by some, it appears 
that having one principle that applies to all cases is preferable to 
having to deal with a vast casuistry that will need to resort to 
adventurous explanations in order to achieve results that are in 
accordance with ideas of justice and fairness.  
 
Regarding the question whether the English law should adopt this 
conceptually clearer approach, the consequences of this conceived 
preference are, however, limited. Unjust enrichment occupies different 
areas in the legal landscapes of German and English law, therefore 
simply implanting a foreign concept will inevitably produce problems. 
